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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
On review of the District court, rendered in it's appellate capacity, the 
appellate court examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and 
whether the magistrate 's conclusions of law follow from the findings; an abuse of 
discretion will be found if the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence or if 
the magistrate does not correctly apply the law, 
Moffettv. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90,253 P. 3d 764 
II 
A contract, when being reviewed as to it's meaning and effect, as well as 
applicable statutes, should be reviewed as to the whole instrument to discern the 
parties' intentions, rights and obligations. 
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P. 3d 289 
Henderson v. Henderson Investment 148 Idaho 638, 225 P.3d 568 
III 
Where reasonable persons could easily reach a different conclusion than that 
of the trial court or draw different inferences from the evidence presented summary 
judgment is not appropriate The Court keeps in mind that conflicting evidentiary 
facts must be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Bonner Life Insurance. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 
Idaho 117, 206 P. 3d 481 .. 
Boise Tower LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,215 P.3d 498 
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IV 
Summary judgment is not proper where the affidavits and record raise any 
question as to the credibility of a witness if that witness is material. 
J. R. Simplot Co. v. Rosen, 144 Idaho 611, 167 P. 3d 748 
V. 
An unambiguous statute must be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning 
and the Supreme Court exercises free review over it's interpretation and 
application. 
Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,216 P. 3d 130 
Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P. 3d 822 
VI 
A promise or statement that an act will be undertaken is actionable where it 
is shown that the speaker never intended to keep it and the determination of the 
legal effect of such a statement is a question of law over which the appellate court 
exercises free review. 
First Security Bank of Idaho v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 805 P.2d 468. 
VII 
A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained 
through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments or under circumstances 
otherwise rendering it unreasonable for the holder of legal title to retain the 
beneficial use of the property and takes effect at the time of the wrongful act tracing 
that gained by the act until rightful recovery is made. 
Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 680 P. 2d 1355, 
Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P. 2d 474 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I 
Did the District Court, sitting as an appellate court, err in determining that 
appellant did not timely appeal from the Magistrate Court decision and that it, the 
3 
District Court, was without authority to consider any of the issues presented by 
plaintiff /appellant? 
II 
Did the Magistrate Court err in changing it's decision from a decision in favor 
of plaintiff to a decision in favor of the defendants? 
III 
Does the record in the magistrate court support an award of summary 
judgment to the defendants? 
w 
Did the Magistrate err in denying plaintiff/appellant's Motion For Partial 
Summazy Judgment? 
V 
Did Pinecone Investors LLC exist on January 1, 2005 or did the legaJ fiction of 
the entity cease to exist at some point in time prior thereto as a result of the 
defendant's failing to comply with the operating agreement? 
VI 
Did the magistrate err in determining to award attorney fees to the 
defendants without a hearing as to the right to receive an award? 
VIII 
Did the magistrate err in not providing a hearing on appellant's request for 
reconsideration of his judgment? 
IX 
Did the District Court err in determining that appellant had waived a right to 
contest the award of attorney fees by the magistrate? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pine Cone Investors, LLC is the business venture from which aJJ issues in this 
proceeding have arisen. In 1994 the respondent Ken Heikes, your appellant, and 
4 
one Darwin Sorensen were directors of Island Park Village Resort, a condominium 
and homeowners resort located at the north end of Island Park Village, Idaho. The 
respondent Jim Pahl had retired from the board of directors at the 1994 annual 
meeting and was both a homeowner and a condominium owner as was the 
respondent E. L Derr. The resort was operated by a company out of Utah that had 
acquired all of the developer's unsold interests that included the business and 
admissions office that was sitting on undeveloped land. Earlier in the year a dispute 
between the directors and the management company had increased in intensity. 
The board of directors had indicated to the management company that it's 
management contract ending in one year would not be renewed and the 
management company had threatened to remove the business and admissions office 
and no longer have it available to the association. As the director's did not have 
time to put the issue before the homeowners' association Mr. Heikes promoted and 
induced appellant to join the others in the establishment of a company that could 
acquire a residence directly across the road from the resort. By agreement the five 
parties formed Pine Cone Investors, LLC and acquired the residence with a down 
payment and an installment contract with a balloon balance due at the end of the 
term. The property acquisition occurred in the latter part of December, 1994 in 
expectation that the residence would be sold to the association in the following year 
as it was located in a commercial zone. Appellant and the other four each 
contributed$ 10,000.00 for a 20% interest in the limited liability company. 
Pursuant to the Operating Agreement the venture was to commence on January 1, 
2005. 
At the annual meeting in 2005 the members association voted to continue 
negotiations with management Later that year or early in 1996 an operating 
agreement was reached with the management company and it became apparent 
that the residence acquired by Pine Cone would not be needed by the association. 
Mr. Heikes listed the property for sale. He also advised that the monies paid in were· 
exhausted and suggested that it might be appropriate for one of the investors to 
purchase the interest of the other investors. No one acted on that suggestion. At the 
end of the term a bank loan was obtained, guaranteed by all five investors, to satisfy 
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payment to the seller. At this time it was decided to lease the residence to cover the 
bank payments while continuing to find a buyer. Mr. Heikes found a couple to 
whom the residence could be leased and requested that your appellant prepare a 
lease agreement for Pine Cone and that was accomplished. In the meantime Mr. 
Sorensen and your appellant individually advised Mr. Heikes that the property could 
become a business site by the development of a storage facility which would be of a 
benefit to association members, in particular the home owners, and other area 
residents. Nothing was heard from Mr. Heikes on our suggestion and no meeting 
was called to discuss it. What we did hear from Mr. Heikes that monies were 
needed to meet the bank loan installments. Mr. Heikes was advised by appellant that 
he would not make an additional capital contribution and as expressed by Mr. 
Heikes, Mr. Sorensen made the same election. This occurred in the forepart of 1998. 
Nothing further was heard on this issue and no meeting was called about it, 
however Mr, Heikes sent a letter to each of us dated October 24, 1998 in which he 
informed us that he was changing his method of accounting on the tax return from 
that of a percentage of ownership interest to that of a II cash basis II attributing the 
first 5 / 6th of the 1998 year on a percentage basis. He continued thereafter to utilize 
the cash basis for each year recognizing the 20% interest in the one asset, the 
residence, of the venture for each member but retaining 100% of the operational 
loss for the tax benefit of the three respondents. No meetings were called for Pine 
Cone Investors as acknowledged by Mr. Heikes. In discovery Mr. Heikes took the 
position that your affiant and Mr. Sorensen abandoned the venture and 
"disassociated" themselves from the venture. Even after October 30. 1998 your 
affiant would on occasion receive a telephone call from Mr. Heikes asking for both 
advise and some physical help in caring for matters at the residence incJuding a visit 
with the prosecuting attorney involving the removal of survey markers and also a 
trespass by a neighbor with whom Pine Cone eventually became involved in a legal 
dispute. The respondents hired an attorney without presenting the issue to all 
members and had not asked affiant for assistance. Affiant called Mr. Heikes to 
inquire as to what was going on and received a copy of a proposed complaint to 
which your affiant made a couple of suggestions. Appellant is unaware of what 
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information, if any, was ever transmitted by any of the respondents to Darwin 
Sorensen. Later a legal action was commenced in the name of Pine Cone Investors, 
LLC against the neighbor over the boundary issue and against the seller for a breach 
of warranty. In the spring of 2004 word was received that a settlement of the suit 
was in the making and that tied in with that there was a potential sale of the 
residence property. Thereafter it was represented by Mr. Heikes that he did not 
know how much "each ofus" ( emphasis supplied) would receive as costs and 
expenses had not been determined. It was also represented to us o behalf of Pine 
Cone that counsel and the title company required each of us to execute a deed in 
order to complete the sale and receive any monies. Pine Cone Investors, LLC 
received net proceeds for it's real estate of$180,414.76 on July 15, 2004 on which 
date each of the five members still owned their initial 20% interest in Pine Cone 
Investors which as a substitute for the residence represents a capital acquisition of 
$30,082.95 for each member of the association. On July 30, 2004 Mr. Heikes 
advised each member that the money was in the bank and that most of the bills had 
been paid resulting in a bank balance of$ 174,346.58 and that there should be 
"slightly more than $171,000 available." He did not disclose that on the same date 
he had issued checks to Mr. Pahl, to Mr. Derr and to himself for the sum of$ 50,000. 
At the same time he solicited an agreement from each member for consent to 
dissolve Pine Cone Investors, LLC .. In September of 2 004 appellant learned that a 
large partial distribution of monies had been made by Mr. Heikes. In January 2005 
Mr. Heilkes transmitted notice that he had filed Articles of Dissolution with the 
Secretary of State even though neither appellant nor Mr. Sorensen had consented to 
dissolution. He also sent a copy of the 2004 K-1 reflecting that he, Mr. Derr and Mr. 
Pahl claimed all of the monies received even though neither of them had ever 
purchased or acquired the proprietary interests of either Mr. Sorensen or your 
appellant 
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ARGUMENT 
At the outset appellant would represent to the Court that he believes there is 
one issue in this proceeding to which attention should be first given as counsel 
could find no Idaho authority for direction. As reflected by the evidence before the 
magistrate the respondents failed to comply with the provisions of the operating . 
agreement of Pine Cone Investors LLC in all respects. No meetings were called and 
no signed written agreements as to any aspect of operations were executed by the 
respondents. In his letter of July 30, 2004 ( Heikes Aff. Ex 0, p. 134) Mr. Heikes cited 
the provisions of the Operating Agreement providing three different ways to effect 
dissolution. The three respondents signed the notice but it was not unanimous and 
neither of the two other alternatives occurred. The respondent's cannot rely on the 
Operating Agreement to support the magistrate's decision that Pine Cone Investors, 
LLC. If the operating agreement is not followed do we still have a valid limited 
liability company or have the members created a form of partnership of some type? 
If the operating agreement is not followed do the provisions of the Idaho statutes 
then apply? Under the provisions of the Idaho Code in effect in 2004 a termination 
notice could be effected by those who executed the original application who, in this 
instance were Mr. Pahl and your appellant ( Heikes Aff .. Ex.A, p.77) That too did 
not occur as appellant did not sign the notice. Appellant raises this issue by reason 
of the magistrate's finding offacts nos. 40 and 41 in which the magistrate agreed 
with appellant that the filing of the Articles Of Dissolution was improper and of no 
effect The magistrate then concluded that this fact did not affect his decision that 
the respondents were properly" winding up the affairs " of the LLC. Counsel can find 
no authority changing the character of this venture that could be considered to 
support such a decision. Both appellant and respondents' counsel proceeded before 
the magistrate utilizing the provisions of the Operating Agreement and Idaho 
statutes, where applicable, as a basis for their respective claims of summary 
judgment or a partial summary judgment Without a change of character there can 
be no winding up of a limited liabilities company without a proper dissolution as 
required by the Operating Agreement and Idaho statutes. Did the magistrate err? 
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On review ofa decision of the District Court. rendered in it's appellate 
capacity, the appellate court examines the magistrate record to determine whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding of 
facts and whether the magistrate's conclusion oflaw follow from the findings; an 
abuse of discretion will be found if the findings of fact are not supported by 
substantial evidence or if the magistrate does not correctly apply the law. 
Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 253 P. 3d 764. Appellant would first call the Court's 
attention to Article V, Section 5.2 ( Heikes Aff. Ex. B, p. 84} that specifically requires 
if any matter is required to be approved or allowed it must be accomplished either 
at a company meeting or by a writing signed by a majority of the members. Article 
5. 1 of the Operating Agreement sets forth the matters that can be approved at a 
meeting or by a writing signed by a majority of the members. A reading of Mr. 
Heikes's deposition clearly reflects non compliance by the respondents in all 
respects including the making of a loan [ Heikes Dep. 294 and 295 ]. Mr. Heikes also 
acknowledged that he made a loan and paid himself interest from monies later put 
in without a meeting or an approval in writing. Does he owe this money back to 
Pine Cone? More significantly the record establishes that one or more of the 
respondents hired an attorney without a meeting or written approval. Should not 
the respondents pay that expense in excess of$ 30,000 back to Pine Cone? 
The Operating Agreement is a contract between the parties. As a contract 
between the parties it was considered by the magistrate when rendering his 
findings of fact and was required by Idaho law to be reviewed as a whole. 
Henderson v. Henderson Investment, 148 Idaho 638,225 P. 3d 748. As the Court 
expressed in Farberv. ldahoStat.e Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P. 3d 289 the legal 
requirement of considering a matter as a whole also applies to the consideration of 
statutes. The magistrate's findings make numerous references asserting that the 
actions of the respondents conform to the Operating Agreement without setting 
forth where and how such met the requirement of the Operating Agreement It 
appears that the magistrate was attempting to rewrite the agreement to be as he 
thought it ought to be rather than how it is. 
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At the outset of these proceedings Mr. Heikes asserted that Mr. Sorensen and 
affiant were disassociated from Pine Cone as of October 31, 1998. As indicated in 
his deposition he based his decision [ Heikes Dep. P. 284-286 ] on an individual oral 
conversation with each of us. He recanted that decision in his second affidavit inn 
2008. [ Heikes Aff., p. 179] It appears that Mr. Heikes did not read or chose to 
ignore the Operating Agreement regarding disassociation. On the other hand it is 
more likely that he chose to treat Mr. Sorensen and affiant as disassociated for the 
personal gain for himself and Mr. Pahl. As he indicated in his deposition he used his 
cash basis accounting for a credit against his ordinary income tax of 28% on federal 
tax and a high rate on Montana state tax. [ Heikes dep. P. 288,289] As noted earlier 
the respondents had not executed the required writings or had a necessary meeting 
in dealing with monies and as such some credibility exists concerning his testimony 
relied upon by the magistrate as set forth in his affidavits. At the same time the 
magistrate accepted the testimony of the accountant who cited as his basis for 
determination that all of the monies received from the sale of the residence should 
be distributed to the respondents. [ Hunter Aff., p. 239, 240 ] For that conclusion he 
cited an Idaho statute that did not exist in 2004. His testimony was also suspect. 
Summary Judgment is not proper where the affidavits and record raise any question 
as to the credibility of a witness if that witness is material.]. R. Simplot Co. v. Rosen, 
144 Idaho 611,167 P. 3d 748. 
Mr. Hunter asserted in his affidavit that a 20 % equity distribution to 
appellant would not be equitable even though he also asserted that he disagreed 
with Mr. Heikes's methods claimed by Mr. Heikes as a "cash basis " of accounting. 
Mr. Hunter also recognized that under one method of accounting appellant would be 
entitled to a distribution of$11,918 [ Hunter dep. Ex. 4 p. 249 ]. He did not consider 
another method of accounting based upon the accounting method of capital account 
adjustment when one asset is substituted for another. He also did not recognize the 
effect of the tax deduction claimed by the respondents. The Pine Cone tax return [ 
Heikes Aff. Ex B, p. 123, 124] filed by Mr. Heikes for the year end 2003 reflected a 
capital account balance of a $ - 1384 for appellant and a capital account balance of$ 
30,882.95 for each of the respondents. When the check for the net proceeds was 
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deposited in the bank the capital account balances 20 % should have been adjusted 
to, as of July 15, 2004, each members beginning year balance increasing appellant's 
capital account balance to$ 29,498.95 and to a capital account balance of the sum of 
$69,780.95. Both the Operating Agreement and the Idaho statute, Section 53-629 
precluded the issuance of$ 50,000 dollar checks by Mr. Heikes to each of the 
respondents. As appellant reads the statute this means an equal amount to each 
member is required if an interim distribution is made. An unambiguous statute on 
review must be given its plain, ordinary and usual meaning and the Supreme Court 
exercises free review over its interpretations and it's application .. Callie v. O'Neal 
147 Idaho 841,216 P. 3d 130, Paolini v. Albertson's Inc. 143 Idaho 547,149 P. 3d 
822. Again an error precluding summary judgment 
The magistrate also concluded that the plaintiff, your appellant, had not 
stated a valid claim against the respondents having especially determined that no 
fraud had been established by appellant A promise or statement that an act will be 
undertaken is actionable where it is shown that the speaker never intended to keep 
it and the determination of the legal effect of such a statement is a question of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. First Security Bank of Idaho v. 
Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 805 P.2d 468. The evidence before the magistrate clearly 
indicated that appellant relied upon the letter representations that " we " and "each 
of us "would receive a distribution as an inducement to execute a deed required to 
complete the sale. The evidence also clearly indicates that Mr. Heikes concealed the 
fact that he had made an interim distribution contrary to law for the gain of each of 
the respondents. A cause of action for fraud is affirmatively stated. 
If the magistrate's conclusion that the respondents were just" winding up 
the affairs " of Pine Cone Investors with the sale of the residence and the interim 
distribution fraudulently made in July it is clear that he not only gave no 
consideration to the whole of the Operating Agreement but he also failed to look at 
Idaho statutes, in particular Section 53-646 which provides that as a part of the 
winding up members must be returned their contribution. No title to appellant's 
interest was ever transferred to the respondents and if the magistrate concluded 
that the distribution of all monies is more equitable not only is he not following the 
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law he is in another way attempting to rewrite the contract Courts do not have the 
power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable. Shawver v. 
Huckelberry Estates, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P. 3d 685. Inequity is not enough to support 
a grant of summary judgment, Losee v. The IDAHO COMPANY et al, 148 Idaho 219, 
220 P. 3d 575 and would constitute a prohibited rewriting of the contract 
Appellant in his complaint has asserted that he is entitled to some of the 
monies obtained from Pine Cone Investments and that the same is in possession of 
the respondents. A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been 
obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments or under 
circumstances otherwise rendering it unreasonable for the holder of legal title to 
retain the beneficial use of the property and takes effect at the time of the wrongful 
act tracing that gained by the act until rightful recovery is made. Andre v. Morrow, 
106 Idaho 455,680 P. 2d 1355, Wittv.Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P. 2d 474. This 
cause of action is also supported by the pleadings and evidence. Additionally 
plaintiff complaint contains a claim of debt against each of the respondents as 
provided by Section 53-632 Idaho Code. Where the appellate court considers 
whether a claim for relief has been stated the record must be considered in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ostranderv. Farm Bureau, 123 Idaho 650, 
851 P.2d 946. Appellant would also urge the Court to consider that Mr. Heikes owed 
a fiduciary duty to appellant by reason of his performance under the Operating 
Agreement The covenant of good faith and fair dealing occurs when either party 
violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefits of the contract Bushi v. Sage 
Health Care PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,203 P. 3d 694. 
The magistrate did find that the two expressions of Mr. Heikes was 
questionable and could be arguable as a basis for fraud. At a minimum this finding 
establishes a question of fact precluding summary judgment to be granted to the 
respondents as it was the burden of the respondents to show that no 
uncontroverted evidence existed on point At best that conclusion establishes that 
appellant should have been granted partial summary judgment as requested. It 
appears to be obvious that in order to grant summary judgment the magistrate 
elected to weigh what he considered to be the evidence as he totally ignored 
12 
evidentiary matters set forth in appellant's affidavits of record. A magistrate's 
decision to weigh the evidence before him is improper on cross motions for 
summary judgment Montgomeryv. Montgomery.147 Idaho 1,205 P.3d 630. 
On November 5, 2009 Judgment was entered against the respondents by the 
magistrate.[ District Court ROA Report p. 5 ] On November 13th Mr. Holmes filed a 
Rule 59 ( e) Motion To Correct Decision and on November 16th appellant filed an 
objection to the motion and requested a hearing. Subsequently, on that same date, 
the magistrate granted Mr. Holmes motion and on December 7, 2009 the magistrate 
filed a denial of defendant's hearing request and Motion to Reconsider. The District 
Court elected to designate Mr. Holmes's motion as a Rule 60 (a) motion and 
determined that as a result the judgment against appellant became final on 
November 9th, the date on which the judgment was entered against the respondents 
thereby determining that the appeal was not timely taken. Appellant would urge 
this Court to consider the Order of the magistrate of December 7th to be the 
appropriate date to commence the running of time. The history of Rule 60 ( a ) 
indicates that it was a means of correcting minor matters after the time for an 
appeal had run. Appellant would contend first of all that a right to a hearing is 
constitutional. Rule 59 ( e) was the immediate method of relief for a party and a 
hearing should have been granted. Additionally appellant would assert that it is 
error of the District Court to assert that the time for running commences at the date 
of the original judgment The writing and entry of a judgment is an exercise of the 
judicial function and is in no way a clerical function. The Court may not in 
correcting a clerical mistake in a judgment or decree, correct judicial error. Fall 
River Irrigation Company v. Swendson, 41 Idaho 686, 241 P. 1021. A motion for 
relief from a judgment due to a clerical mistake is not to be used for purposes of 
correcting errors of substance. Rostentrator v. Rostentrator., 708 NE 2d 628 ( Ind ). 
Appellant would suggest that the entry of judgment by the magistrate was a matter 
of substance. The respondents would be hard put to obtain an execution request 
against appellant from the clerk based on a judgment against the requesting parties. 
The finding by the magistrate against the respondents was a specific conclusion. 
13 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
When the court changes the judgment where the judgment relates to a " substantial 
defect'' in the initial judgment the same is improper. Frost v. Ayejiak, 957 P. 2d 1353, 
( Alaska ). A misnomer is a " substantial defect" that cannot be corrected under Rule 
60 (a). Here it may have been a blunder in execution but it is certainly not a simple 
" clerical mistake " and as such is error by the District Court 
Appellant also believes that the District Court erred when it determined that 
it could not consider the issue of attorney fees or the summary judgment issues. 
The district court is a court of equity and it can be readily determined that the 
magistrate had committed many errors of law. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ( 7 ) 
provides for review of post judgment orders and it would seem that, in the interest 
of justice, it would find a way to overcome the conversion of appellant's monies 
rather than to protect he magistrate in his erroneous decision. 
magistrate. On summary judgment if reasonable persons could reach differing 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable persons could easily reach a different con cl us ion than that of the 
conclusions or draw different inferences from the evidence presented summary 
judgment is not appropriate. Boise Tower LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 77 4, 215 P.3d 
498. The Court keeps in mind that conflicting evidentiary facts must be viewed in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Bonner Life Insurance. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson 
Irrevocable Trust, 14 7 Idaho 117, 206 P. 3d 481. Appellant contends that the 
magistrate's decision is replete with error. The magistrates findings are both 
· somewhat confused and in conflict On some issues they are lacking or are 
unsupported by the record. The entry of summary judgment against the appellant 
for a debt that was forgiven ( the negative capital account) in the respondents' 
accounting seems to be beyond comprehension. Appellant recalls that this Court 
has on occasion rendered a decision granting summary judgment to the party 
opposing the granting of summary judgment on appeal. Appellant had sought 
partial summary judgment seeking only for a determination that some monies were 
14 
due to him believing that even his claim for a sum as might be shown by the 
substituted capital account increases for all was also inequitable hoping that an 
equitable solution might be reached after such a determination had been made. As 
a member some share of the loss was anticipated but certainly not 100 per cent 
Appellant would request that the District Court erred in not exercising its equitable 
powers as well as having erred in determining that the time for appeal had 
commenced as of the original judgment against the respondents. 
Respectfully Submitted 
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